We investigate the computational complexity of reasoning about multi-agent systems using the cooperation logic ATL of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman. It is known that satisfiability checking is EXPTIME-complete for "full" ATL, and PSPACE-complete (in the general case) for the fragment of ATL corresponding to Pauly's Coalition Logic. In contrast, the model checking problems for ATL and Coalition Logic can both be solved in time polynomial in the size of the formula and the size of model against which the formula is to be checked. However, these latter results assume an extensive representation of models, in which all states of a model are explicitly enumerated. Such representations are not feasible in practice. In this paper we investigate the complexity of the ATL and Coalition Logic model checking problems for a more "reasonable" model representation known as SRML ("Simple Reactive Modules Language"), a simplified version of the actual model representation languages used for model checkers such as SMV and MOCHA. While it is unsurprising that, when measured against such representations, the model checking problems for ATL and Coalition Logic have a higher complexity than when measured against explicit state representations, we show that in fact the ATL and Coalition Logic model checking problems for SRML models have the same complexity as the corresponding satisfiability problems. That is, model checking ATL formulae against SRML models is EXPTIME-complete, and model checking Coalition Logic formulae against SRML models is PSPACE-complete. We conclude by investigating some technical issues around these results, and discussing their implications.
INTRODUCTION
Cooperation logics -such as Pauly's Coalition Logic [19, 20, 9] and its temporal extension, the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman [2] -have attracted much interest from the multi-agent systems community [23, 14, 15, 11] . Using such logics, it is possible to reason about the strategic powers of agents and coalitions of agents in game-like multi-agent scenarios.
If one aims to use logics such as ATL and Coalition Logic to reason about systems, then it is obvious to ask how complex the associated reasoning problems are for such logics. Given a particular (multi-agent) system ξ, there are essentially two approaches that may be adopted to reasoning about ξ: theorem proving (via satisfiability checking) and model checking [4] . The satisfiability problem for ATL is EXPTIME-complete, and is hence prohibitively expensive [7, 25] ; satisfiability for Coalition Logic is "only" PSPACEcomplete [19, 20, 21] , and thus apparently easier, but of course this "easiness" is relative: PSPACE-completeness is an extremely negative complexity result! In contrast, model checking approaches to reasoning about systems appear to be computationally easier. Model checking was originally developed as a technique for verifying that finite state concurrent systems satisfy specifications expressed in the language of temporal logic [8] . The basic idea is that the state transition graph of a system ξ can be understood as a model M ξ for a temporal logic such as Computation Tree Logic (CTL): if we express desirable or undesirable properties of ξ as formulae ϕ of CTL, we can then check whether or not ξ has these properties by evaluating whether or not M ξ |= ϕ, and this can be done in deterministic polynomial time [8, p.1044] . Now, one of the attractive features of ATL (and Coalition Logic) is that its model checking problem is apparently no harder than that of its ancestor CTL. More formally, the model checking problem, as discussed in [2] is as follows. We are given an ATS (i.e., an ATL model) S , a state q from S , a formula ϕ over S and we are asked whether S , q |= ϕ. It is shown in [2] that this problem is tractable: it can be solved in time O(|S | × |ϕ|), where |S | is the size of S and |ϕ| is the size of ϕ. However, this apparently positive result has a well-known catch. It assumes that the ATS S is explicitly enumerated in the input to the problem, and in particular, that all the states of S are listed in the input. Of course, if S has n Boolean variables, then there may be 2 n possibles states. Moreover, in a very recent result, Jamroga and Dix point out that this tractability result only goes through if the number of agents is fixed, and not considered a parameter of the problem [13] . They show that if the number of agents is considered an input to the model checking problem, then model checking is NP-complete with respect to a representation of ATL models as alternating transition systems, and even worse -Σ p 2 -complete -for the representation of ATL models as concurrent game structures.
So, the tractability result for ATL model checking is perhaps misleading, since we have tractability only if we explicitly enumerate all states of the system in the input, and only if we assume the number of agents is fixed, and not part of the input.
The complexity of ATL model checking is thus particularly sensitive to the representation of the model given as input. An obvious question to ask is what kinds of representations are used in practice, by actual model checking systems. In fact, practical model checkers such as SMV (for CTL) [17] , SPIN (for LTL) [12] , and MOCHA (for ATL) [3] use a succinct model specification language for defining models. While the model specification languages used by these systems differ on details, they all have the flavour of programming languages, providing the verifier with a relatively high-level way of defining models. But this then raises the question of the extent to which the apparently positive complexity results for CTL, ATL, and Coalition Logic model checking hold when using such model representation languages. It comes as no surprise that model checking against such model representations will be harder. For example, a PSPACE-completeness result for CTL model checking against a representation of concurrent programs was obtained by Kupferman et al [16] , and extended to combinations of CTL with knowledge in [22] .
However, to date, the issue of complexity of ATL model checking for realistic model specification languages has not been investigated, and this is the aim of the present paper. The particular model specification language we focus on is called SRML ("Simple Reactive Modules Language"), and is a slightly simplified version of the REACTIVE MODULES LANGUAGE (RML) [1] . We are particularly interested in RML for several reasons: first, RML is the language that is actually used by the ATL model checking system MOCHA [3] ; it has been shown to be well suited to building models of a range of multi-agent protocols; and RML programs can easily be used to code basic reactive agents. As we pointed out above, it is unsurprising that, assuming representations such as SRML, the model checking problems for ATL and Coalition Logic have a higher complexity than when measured against explicit state representations, particularly given the results of Jamroga and Dix [13] . However, we show that in fact the ATL and Coalition Logic model checking problems for SRML programs have the same complexity as the corresponding satisfiability problems! That is, model checking ATL formulae against SRML programs is EXPTIME-complete, and model checking Coalition Logic formulae against SRML programs is PSPACEcomplete. There is thus a huge gulf -much larger than perhaps might be expected -between the provably tractable model checking problem for explicit state models and the provably intractable model checking problem for "realistic" model representations. Indeed, it again raises the question of the relative merits of theorem proving versus model checking [10] . We begin by describing ATL and then SRML, the simplified variant of RML that we use throughout the paper. We present our main results in section 4. We conclude by investigating some technical issues around these results, and discussing their implications.
ATL
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [2] can be understood as a generalisation of the well-known branching time temporal logic CTL [8] , in which path quantifiers are replaced by cooperation modalities. A cooperation modality C ϕ, where C is a group of agents, expresses the fact that there exists a strategy profile for C such that by following this strategy profile, C can ensure ϕ. Thus, for example, the system requirement "agents 1 and 2 can cooperate to ensure that the system never enters a fail state" may be captured by the ATL formula 1, 2 ¬fail . The " " temporal operator means "now and forever more": additional temporal connectives in ATL are "♦" ("either now or at some point in the future"), " U " ("until"), and " f " ("in the next state").
To give a precise definition of ATL, we must first introduce the semantic structures over which formulae of ATL are interpreted. An alternating transition system (ATS) is a 6-tuple S = Π, Σ, Q, Q0, π, δ , where:
• Π is a finite, non-empty set of Boolean variables;
• Σ = {a1, . . . , an } is a finite, non-empty set of agents;
• Q is a finite, non-empty set of states, with Q0 ⊆ Q representing the initial states of Q;
• π : Q → 2 Π gives the set of Boolean variables satisfied in each state;
is the system transition function, which maps states and agents to the choices available to these agents. Thus δ(q, a) is the set of choices available to agent a when the system is in state q. We require that this function satisfy the requirement that for every state q ∈ Q and every set Q1, . . . , Qn of choices Qi ∈ δ(q, ai ), the intersection Q1 ∩ · · · ∩ Qn is a singleton.
(Initial states Q0 were not considered part of ATSs in the original publications on ATL: we introduce them to be consistent with the behaviour of model checkers for ATL, which check formulae against the initial state of the system: see below.)
An ATL formula, formed with respect to an alternating transition system S = Π, Σ, Q, Q0, π, δ , is then defined by the following grammar:
where p ∈ Π is a Boolean variable, and C ⊆ Σ is a set of agents. We assume the remaining connectives of classical logic ("⊥", "→", "←", "↔", "∧") are defined as abbreviations in the usual way, and define C ♦ϕ as C ⊤ U ϕ.
To give the semantics of ATL, we need some further definitions. For two states q, q ′ ∈ Q and an agent a ∈ Σ, we say that state q ′ is an a-successor of q if there exists a set
is a possible outcome of one of the choices available to a when the system is in state q. We denote by succ(q, a) the set of asuccessors to state q, and say that q ′ is simply a successor of q if for all agents a ∈ Σ, we have q ′ ∈ succ(q, a); intuitively, if q ′ is a successor to q, then when the system is in state q, the agents Σ can cooperate to ensure that q ′ is the next state the system enters. A computation of an ATS Π, Σ, Q, Q0, π, δ is an infinite sequence of states λ = q0, q1, . . . such that for all u > 0, the state qu is a successor of qu−1. A computation λ ∈ Q ω starting in state q is referred to as a q-computation; if u ∈ N, then we denote by λ[u] the u'th state in λ; similarly, we denote by λ[0, u] and λ[u, ∞] the finite prefix q0, . . . , qu and the infinite suffix qu , qu+1, . . . of λ respectively.
Intuitively, a strategy is an abstract model of an agent's decisionmaking process; a strategy may be thought of as a kind of plan for an agent. Formally, a strategy fa for an agent a ∈ Σ is a total function fa : Q + → 2 Q , which must satisfy the constraint that fa (λ · q) ∈ δ(q, a) for all λ ∈ Q * and q ∈ Q. Given a set C ⊆ Σ of agents, and an indexed set of strategies FC = {fa | a ∈ C }, one for each agent a ∈ C , we define out(q, FC ) to be the set of possible outcomes that may occur if every agent a ∈ C follows the corresponding strategy fa , starting when the system is in state q ∈ Q. That is, the set out(q, FC ) will contain all possible qcomputations that the agents C can "enforce" by cooperating and following the strategies in FC . Note that the "grand coalition" of all agents in the system can cooperate to uniquely determine the future state of the system, and so out(q, FΣ) is a singleton. Similarly, the set out(q, F ∅ ) is the set of all possible q-computations of the system.
We can now give the rules defining the satisfaction relation "|=" for ATL, which holds between pairs of the form S , q (where S is an ATS and q is a state in S ), and formulae of ATL:
(where p ∈ Π);
S , q |= C f ϕ iff there exists a set of strategies FC , such
S , q |= C ϕ iff there exists a set of strategies FC , such that for all λ ∈ out(q, FC ),
S , q |= C ϕ U ψ iff there exists a set of strategies FC , such that for all λ ∈ out(q, FC ), there exists some u ∈ N such that S , λ[u] |= ψ, and for all 0 ≤ v < u, we have
Satisfaction for the ATL formula C ♦ϕ is defined via equivalence to C ⊤ U ϕ.
We identify two important fragments of ATL which we will subsequently refer to:
• Propositional logic is the fragment of ATL in which no cooperation modalities are permitted. The truth of a propositional logic formula is determined on an ATS by using the first four items of the definition for satisfaction above.
• Coalition Logic is the fragment of ATL in which the only cooperation modalities allowed are of the form C f [19, 20, 9] . The truth of a Colition Logic formula is determined on an ATS by using the first five items of the definition for satisfaction above.
The (explicit state) model checking problem 1 is the problem of determining, for a given formula ϕ and ATS S = Π, Σ, Q, Q0, π, δ , whether S , q |= ϕ for all q ∈ Q0. The model checking problems for ATL (and hence Coalition Logic) can be solved by a deterministic algorithm in time polynomial in the size of the inputs ATS S and the formula ϕ [2, pp.690-691] -assuming that ATS S in question is explicitly enumerated in the input in all its components, and the number of agents is considered fixed [13] .
For the satisfiability problem, we are simply given a formula ϕ and asked whether there is an ATS S and state q in S such that S , q |= ϕ. The satisfiability problem for ATL is EXPTIMEcomplete [7, 25] , while for Coalition Logic it is PSPACE-complete in the general case [19, p.63 ].
SRML
We have already observed that the positive tractability results for ATL and Coalition Logic model checking rely on the assumption that the model against which a formula is to be checked is explicitly enumerated in the input to the model checking algorithm, and that this assumption is both infeasible (there will be exponentially many states in the number of Boolean variables), and never used in practice. Instead, practical model checkers such as SMV [17] , SPIN [12] , and MOCHA [3] use model specification languages which permit the succinct, high-level specification of models. In this section, we describe the language used in this paper for this purpose: the Simple Reactive Modules Language (SRML). As its name suggests, this language is a strict subset of the RML language used in the MOCHA model checker 2 . Note that our choice of language is not arbitrary: we comment on it below. We begin with an informal overview.
Overview
Agents in RML are known as modules, and for consistency with the pre-existing literature on RML, we will stay with this terminology in SRML. An SRML module consists of:
• an interface, which defines the name of the module and lists the Boolean variables under the control of the module; and
• a number of guarded commands, which define the choices available to the module at every state.
The states of an SRML-defined model correspond to the possible valuations that may be given to the Boolean variables under the control of modules in the system: for the purposes of SRML, two states that agree on the valuation of all variables are the same 3 . The guarded commands of a module are divided into two sets: those used for initialising the variables under the module's control (init guarded commands), and those used for updating these variables subsequently (update guarded commands). A guarded command has two parts: a "condition" part (the "guard"), and a corresponding "action" part, which defines how to update the value of (some of) the variables under the control of a module. The intuitive reading of a guarded command ϕ ; e is "if the condition ϕ is satisfied, then one of the choices available to the module is to execute the assignment expression e". The assignment expression e is essentially a sequence of assignment statements, just as in conventional imperative programming languages: these assignment statements define how (some subset of) the module's controlled variables should be updated if the guarded command is executed. Notice that the truth of the guard ϕ does not mean that e will be executed: only that it is enabled for execution -it may be executed. If no guarded commands of a given module are enabled in some state, then the values of the variables in that module are assumed to remain unchanged in the next state: the module has no choice.
The choices available to a module wrt initialisation of its variables are thus defined by the init guarded commands of the module, while the choices available to a module wrt updating its variables are defined by the update guarded commands. To make this more concrete, here is an example guarded command:
The guard is the propositional logic formula x ∧ y, so this guarded command will be enabled in any system state where both x and y take the value "⊤". If the guarded command is chosen, then the effect is that in the next state of the system, the variable x will take value ⊥, while y will take value ⊤. (The "prime" notation v ′ means "the value of variable v after the statement is executed".) We will write skip as an abbreviation for the empty assignment expression, which leaves the value of every variable controlled by a module unchanged.
Here is an example of a module, illustrating the concrete syntax that we will use for modules (which is essentially that of RML [1] ).
This module, named toggle, controls a single Boolean variable, x . There are two init guarded commands and two update guarded commands. (The symbol "[ ]" is a syntactic separator.) The init guarded commands of toggle define two choices for the initialisation of this variable: assign it the value ⊤ or the value ⊥. With respect to update guarded commands, the first command says that if x has the value ⊤, then the corresponding choice is to assign it the value ⊥, while the second command says that if x has the value ⊥, then it can subsequently be assigned the value ⊤. In other words, the module non-deterministically chooses a value for x initially, and then on subsequent rounds toggles this value. Notice that in this example, the init commands of this module are non-deterministic, while the update commands are deterministic.
Formal Definition
In this section, we will use Π to denote the set of Boolean variables in a system, as in ATL. Formally, a guarded command γ over Π is an expression
where ϕ (the guard) is a propositional logic formula over Π, each vi is a member of Π and ψi is a propositional logic formula over Π. We require that no variable vi appears on the l.h.s. of two assignment statements in the same guarded command (hence no issue on the ordering of the updates arises). The intended interpretation is that if the formula ϕ evaluates to true against the interpretation corresponding to the current state of the system, then the statement is enabled for execution; executing the statement means evaluating each ψi against the current state of the system, and setting the corresponding variable vi to the truth value obtained from evaluating ψi . We say that v1, . . . , v k are the controlled variables of γ, and denote this set by ctr (γ). A set of guarded commands is said to be disjoint if their controlled variables are mutually disjoint. Given a propositional valuation θ ⊆ Π and a guarded command γ : ϕ ; v ′ 1 := ψ1; . . . ; v ′ k := ψ k such that θ enables γ (i.e., θ |= ϕ) we denote the result of executing γ on θ by θ ⊕ γ. For example, if θ = {p, r }, and γ = p ; q ′ := ⊤; r ′ := p ∧ ¬r , then θ ⊕ γ = {p, q}.
Given a propositional valuation θ ⊆ Π, and set Γ of disjoint guarded commands over Π such that every member of Γ is enabled by θ, then the interpretation θ ′ resulting from Γ on θ is denoted by θ ′ = θ ⊕ Γ: since the members of Γ are disjoint, we can pick them in any order to execute on θ.
As described above, there are two classes of guarded commands that may be declared in an atom: init and update. An init guarded command is only used to initialise the values of variables, when the system begins execution. Full RML allows for quite sophisticated initialisation schemes, but in SRML, we will assume that the guards to init command are "⊤", i.e., every init command is enabled for execution in the initialisation round of the system. An SRML module, m, is a triple: m = ctr , init, update where:
• ctr ⊆ Π is the (finite) set of variables controlled by m;
• init is a (finite) set of initialisation guarded commands, such that for all γ ∈ init, we have ctr (γ) ⊆ ctr ; and
• update is a (finite) set of update guarded commands, such that for all γ ∈ init, we have ctr (γ) ⊆ ctr .
Given a module m, we denote the controlled variables of m by ctr (m), the initialisation guarded commands of m by init(m), and the update guarded commands of m by update(m). An SRML system is then an (n + 2)-tuple Σ, Π, m1, . . . , mn where Σ = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents and Π is a vocabulary of Boolean variables, (as in ATSs), and for each i ∈ Σ, mi is the corresponding module defining i's choices; we require that {ctr (m1), . . . , ctr (mn )} forms a partition of Π (i.e., every variable in Π is controlled by some agent, and no variable is controlled by more than one agent).
A joint guarded command (j.g.c.) for a coalition C ⊆ Σ is an indexed tuple γ1, . . . , γ k , with a guarded command γi ∈ mi for each i ∈ C . A j.g.c. γ1, . . . , γ k is enabled by a propositional valuation θ ⊆ Π iff all its members are enabled by θ.
Given an SRML system R, the corresponding ATS, which we denote by SR, is defined in the obvious way:
• the states Q of SR correspond to the possible valuations to variables Π, with Q0 being the subset of Q that may be generated by the init guarded commands of the modules in R; and
• the δ function of SR is defined in each state for each possible coalition by the sets of enabled guarded commands (choices) for that coalition.
We write R |= ϕ to indicate that SR, q0 |= ϕ for every initial state q0 in SR: the SRML model checking problem is then the problem of checking, for given R and ϕ, whether or not R |= ϕ.
MAIN RESULTS
We now present our main results. Given the concerns of this paper -understanding the complexity of ATL model checking for a particular model representation -the first of these results may seem somewhat strange, but its role will become clear shortly. We show that, given an SRML system R, we can construct a formula mimic(R) of ATL such that mimic(R) is only satisfied in models that are "equivalent" to SR. We can thus understand mimic(R) as representing the ATL theory of R. An important property of the construction of mimic(R) is that this formula is of size polynomial in the size of R. For such a mimic(R), we must characterize the behaviour of R in the sense that:
(a) abilities in R are transferred to models satisfying mimic(R); (b) agents should not be able to achieve more in any mimic(R)-model than the modules can do in R.
The construction of mimic(R) is as follows. Let the variables ctr (i) under control of module i be v i 1 , . . . , v i j , and let the module i be ctr (i), init, update . We are now going to define requirements t(init, i), (2) , (3) and (4); they are supposed to take care of our condition (a). Regarding init, we do the following. Suppose there are ci init guarded commands for agent i, and let a typical init guarded command ι 
This formula t(init, i) expresses the effect of executing one of the ci guarded commands ιa for agent i. Note that we do not have an exclusive disjunction here, since it might well be that the effect of executing one initialsation command ιa may coincide with that of another. Given an SRML-system R, it is obvious that in its associated ATS SR, a state q verifies t(init, i) iff q is one of the initial states in Q0.
Now we turn to the update part of the module. Suppose it looks like the following (note that all v ′i j are occurrences of i's variables, not the variables themselves).
Given an SMRL R, introduce for every ψ kt (k ≤ m, t ≤ nk ) a new propositional variable x kt . The idea is that every x will store the old value of its corresponding ψ, so we stipulate:
Some of i's variables will not be changed by executing a command, so we also need to keep track of the variables old values. For that, we introduce, for every v 
We now look at our constraint (b), which should take care of the fact that the if σ is ATL-satisfiable, it should be in a context that is behaving well enough in order to be transferred to an SMRL R. To guarantee that an agent i cannot spontaneously bring about anything that is not triggered by the execution of a command γ i z , we introduce propositional variables done(i, 1), . . . , done(i, m) and a special atom none(i). The latter atom denotes that i did not execute any of its guarded commands. Now consider a command γ 
where
and
new (i) says that the values of the relevant ψ kt are, via x kt , copied in the corresponding variable v i kt , and the other variables u of i receive their 'old' values through a copy of the corresponding variables y. This takes care of our goal specified as (a). For the (b)-part, rec(i, z ) takes a record of which guarded command has been applied. This ensures that agent i indeed 'only' executes guarded commands, if we add the global properties (5)- (8): (5) expresses that agent i will only do nothing if all his guards are false; (6) says that i can only execute the k -th command if the k -th guard is true; (7) expresses that if a flag is set indicating that i executes the k -th command, then, indeed, this command is executed, and the none(i)-flag is not set to true, and, finally, (8) expresses that either i does nothing, or he executes exactly one of his guarded commands and that doing nothing implies keeping all the "old" values for i's variables.
We are now in a position to define mimic(R):
Note that the size of mimic(R) is polynomial in R, since we only add a given number of new variables, where the number depends on the number of local variables and the number of formulas ψ appearing at the right of a ":=" in any command, and each of the conjuncts in mimic(R) is polynomial in R. Now, suppose we have some S , q such that S , q |= mimic(R). The states of S will not look exactly like the states of SR, since they will include propositional variables that will not be in SR (i.e., the new variables we introduced in the translation). But nevertheless, the properties of agents -their abilities, with respect to the propositional variables of R -must be the same in the ATS S that satisfies mimic(R) as in R. In short: the model S must preserve the truth of ATL formulae over R.
Returning to the main concerns of the paper, we now see the relevance of this construction. THEOREM 1. The ATL model checking problem for SRML is polynomial-time reducible to ATL unsatisfiability.
PROOF. Let R be the given SRML system, and ϕ be the formula we want to check. Then the following are equivalent:
The rationale for stating this result will become clear in the following: THEOREM 2. The ATL model checking problem for SRML models is EXPTIME-complete.
PROOF. Membership of EXPTIME follows from the fact, proved in Theorem 1, that the ATL model checking problem for SRML is polynomial time reducible to ATL unsatisfiability. Since the ATL satisfiability problem is EXPTIME complete [7, 25] , then ATL unsatisfiability is in co-EXPTIME; but since EXPTIME is a deterministic complexity class, EXPTIME = co-EXPTIME, and we conclude that the SRML model checking for SRML is in EXPTIME.
We prove EXPTIME-hardness by reduction from the problem of determining whether a given player has a winning strategy in the two-player game PEEK-G4 [24, p.158 ]. An instance of PEEK-G4 is a quad: X1, X2, X3, ϕ where:
• X1 and X2 are disjoint, finite sets of Boolean variables, with the intended interpretation that the variables in X1 are under the control of agent 1, and X2 are under the control of agent 2;
• X3 ⊆ (X1 ∪ X2) are the variables deemed to be true in the initial state of the game; and
• ϕ is a propositional logic formula over the variables X1 ∪X2, representing the winning condition.
The game is played in a series of rounds, with the agents i ∈ {1, 2} alternating (with agent 1 moving first) to select a value (true or false) for one of their variables in Xi , with the game starting from the initial assignment of truth values defined by X3. Variables that were not changed retain the same truth value in the subsequent round. An agent wins in a given round if it makes a move such that the resulting truth assignment defined by that round makes the winning formula ϕ true. The decision problem associated with PEEK-G4 involves determining whether agent 2 has a winning strategy in a given game instance X1, X2, X3, ϕ . Notice that PEEK-G4 only requires "memoryless" (Markovian) strategies: whether or not an agent i can win depends only on the current truth assignment, the distribution of variables, the winning formula, and whose turn it is currently. As a corollary, if agent i can force a win, then it can force a win in O(2
Given an instance X1, X2, X3, ϕ of PEEK-G4, we produce an instance of SRML model checking as follows. For each Boolean variable x ∈ (X1 ∪ X2), we create a variable with the same name in our SRML model, and we create an additional Boolean variable turn, with the intended interpretation that if turn = ⊤, then it is agent 1's turn to move, while if turn = ⊥, then it is agent 2's turn to move. We have a module move, the purpose of which is to control turn, toggling its value in each successive round, starting from the initial case of it being agent 1's move.
For each of the two PEEK-G4 players i ∈ {1, 2}, we create an SRML module agi that controls the variables Xi . The module agi is as follows. It begins by deterministically initialising the values of all its variables to the values defined by X3 (that is, if variable x ∈ Xi appears in X3 then this variable is initialised to ⊤, otherwise it is initialised to ⊥). Subsequently, when it is this player's turn, it can non-deterministically choose at most one of the variables under its control and toggle the value of this variable; when it is not this player's turn, it has no choice but to do nothing, leaving the value of all its variables unchanged. The general structure of ag1 is thus as follows, where X1 = {x1, . . . , x k }.
Notice that an agent can always skip, electing to leave its variables unchanged; and, if it is not this agent's turn to move, this is the only choice it has.
The SRML system under consideration contains just these three modules. It can be shown easily that player 2 has a strategy for ϕ in the PEEK-G4 game X1, X2, X3, ϕ iff the SRML system satisfies the formula 2 (¬ϕ) U (ϕ ∧ turn).
There are several small points of interest about this proof. First, notice that the reduction used for EXPTIME-hardness requires only a fixed number of agents (three). Thus we have the following, stronger result: ATL model checking for SRML models is EXPTIME complete for any fixed number n of modules, where n ≥ 3. Second, notice the form of the guarded commands used in the reduction: on the rhs of any guard, we only change the value of at most one variable. Thus, again, we have a stronger result: EXPTIME hardness even when guarded commands are assumed to be of this particularly impoverished form.
Next, we turn our attention to significant subsets of ATL: first, Coalition Logic, the fragment in which the only temporal modality allowed is " f " [19, 21, 9] . THEOREM 3. The Coalition Logic model checking problem for SRML models is PSPACE-complete.
21.
for each θ-enabled update j.g.c. γ l+1 , . . . , γn for Σ \ C do 22. if not aux (ψ, θ ⊕ {γ 1 , . . . , γ l , γ l+1 , . . . , γn }, R) then 23. SRML system R, and a formula ϕ of coalition logic to check against this system. The algorithm is in two parts: the first part (the function eval (· · · )) generates each initial state of the system in turn from the initial guarded commands of the modules comprising R, and then invokes the auxiliary function aux (· · · ) to check whether the input ϕ is true in these initial states. The aux (· · · ) function is recursive; we note that the number of recursive calls will be bounded by the size of the input formula ϕ, with each call requiring only polynomial space. Termination and correctness are immediate from construction; it only remains to note that we can loop through the enabled initial guarded commands (lines 3-7) and the enabled update guarded commands (lines 19-23) in polynomial space.
So, under standard complexity theoretic assumptions, model checking Coalition Logic against SRML models is "easier" than full ATL. Suppose we consider other restrictions on the logic that we check. PROOF. For membership, simply note that we can universally select all initial j.g.c.s γ1, . . . , γm , and check that if γ1, . . . , γm is satisfied by the empty truth assignment θ ∅ , then the interpretation θ ∅ ⊕ {γ1, . . . , γm } satisfies ϕ. For completeness, we can reduce the problem TAUT, of checking that a propositional logic formula is a tautology, i.e., satisfied under all truth assignments. For each Boolean variable x appearing in the input instance ϕ, we create an agent controlling x , with two initial guarded commands, both enabled by the empty assignment θ ∅ , which set x to ⊤ and ⊥ respectively. The formula to be checked against this system is simply the TAUT instance ϕ. The initial states of the system thus constructed correspond to all valuations of the variables of ϕ, and hence ϕ is a tautology iff ϕ holds in all initial states of the system.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have shown that, for three important subsets of ATL (including ATL itself), the model checking problem has exactly the same complexity as the corresponding theorem proving problem, assuming that models are represented using SRML, a simplified version of RML [1] . This seems to us to be a striking result: practical model checking for ATL and Coalition Logic has the same complexity as theorem proving for these logics. We note that others have pointed out that ATL model checking is more complex than it might appear [13] , and other results hint that practical ATL model checking might be more complex than it appears at first sight [5, 6] : we have obtained tight bounds on the complexity of these problems for a specific, practical representation for models.
It is important to note that the SRML language is not contrived: it is a strict subset of the RML language that is used by several practical model checking systems, including MOCHA, the ATL model checker [3] . Indeed, SRML is arguably the smallest "useful" subset of RML that one can imagine: it is hard to imagine how one could simplify it without making it unusable in practice. It is also worth noting that the guarded command structures used to define SRML models are also used (modulo syntactic differences) for the same purpose in other model checking systems such as SPIN [12] and SMV [17] .
We note that one of the motivations for developing the Coalition Logic of Propositional Control (CL-PC), a simpler modal variation of ATL [11] , was that the structure of controlled variables in languages like RML permitted a more direct (and simpler) semantics to cooperation modalities. This link -between the interpretation of cooperation modalities and the languages used to define modelsis worth exploring further.
